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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cari Leone Oxford was convicted of burglary and second degree kidnapping following a
jury trial. Ms. Oxford was initially determined to be incompetent, and was diagnosed with a
psychotic disorder. Ms. Oxford's competence was restored, however, allowing her case to
proceed to trial. At trial, the jury never learned of Ms. Oxford's mental illness, which could have
provided a complete defense to the charges against her, as the district court denied her attorney's
request for funds to retain an expert to provide an opinion as to whether Ms. Oxford was capable
of possessing the intent necessary to commit the charged crimes. Because there was no evidence
presented to the jury regarding Ms. Oxford's mental condition, the district court refused to
instruct the jury that it could consider Ms. Oxford's mental condition in determining whether she
had the requisite criminal intent.
Ms. Oxford appeals from her judgment of conviction, raising three issues. First, she
contends she was denied her constitutional right to due process and equal protection when the
district court denied her motion for funds to retain an expert witness. Second, she contends the
district court erred in refusing to permit the psychologist who examined her for purposes of her
competency evaluation to testify at trial regarding her mental condition. Third, she contends the
district court erred in ordering her to pay restitution in the amount of $6,072.09 to the Idaho
Industrial Commission for expenses ostensibly incurred for medical treatment.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On August 13, 2017, Ms. Oxford confronted one of her neighbors, Bambi Thometz, who
was carrying her 18-month-old son at the time, and yelled at her "about not going into the
laundry room." (Tr., p.166, L.21 - p.169, L.8.) Ms. Oxford followed Ms. Thometz into her
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apartment, and began kicking and punching her. (Tr., p.169, L.23 - p.175, L.13.) Ms. Oxford
grabbed Ms. Thometz's baby by his arm, and dragged him, screaming, out of his mother's
apartment and into her own apartment, locking the door behind her. (Tr., p.177, L.19 - p.178,
L.11.) Ms. Thometz testified Ms. Oxford "was spouting complete nonsense," and she "was
absolutely trying to snap [Ms. Oxford] out of whatever was making her so mad .... " (Tr., p.196,
Ls.10-14, p.197, Ls.14-21.)
When the police arrived, Ms. Oxford let them into her apartment after they knocked
"several times." (Tr., p.205, Ls.9-21.) One of the officers testified Ms. Oxford was holding the
baby to her chest, and "said she didn't want me to take her baby away." (Tr., p.206, Ls.7-25.)
The officer took the baby from Ms. Oxford, and two other officers handcuffed Ms. Oxford.
(Tr., p.207, L.1 - p.208, L.10.) The officer who took the baby testified Ms. Oxford said the
baby's name was Javon Oxford, and said she did not want the officer to give the baby back to the
neighbor. 1 (Tr., p.208, Ls.14-23.) The officer testified Ms. Oxford "seemed ... confused about
the baby's age" saying at one point that he was a few months old, and at another point that he
was in his twenties. (Tr., p.208, L.24 - p.209, L.3.) The officer testified Ms. Oxford "really
seemed disoriented" and "there was certainly something going on." (Tr., p.210, L.17 - p.211,
L.2.) The officer returned the baby, unharmed, to his mother. (Tr., p.209, Ls.4-9.) The jury heard
an audio recording of the incident, in which Ms. Oxford can be heard shouting repeatedly, "It's
my son!" and saying, "They're stealing my baby from me." (Def Ex. 2 at 00:00-00:21, 01:0001:03; Tr., p.219, Ls.2-4.)
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Though the jury did not learn of it, Ms. Oxford has a son, Jerron, who was
at the
time of Ms. Oxford's sentencing. (Conf. Docs., p.14.) Ms. Oxford reported to the presentence
investigator that her ex-husband kidnapped her son, and she had not had any contact with her son
for 25 years. (Id.)
2

The State filed charges against Ms. Oxford on August 14, 2017. (R., pp.17-19.) The
magistrate court continued the preliminary hearing at defense counsel's request, and ordered a
competency evaluation of Ms. Oxford pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 18-210 and 18-211. (R., pp.5764.) Dr. Traughber, a licensed psychologist, evaluated Ms. Oxford on October 3, 2017, and
determined she was not competent to proceed. (R., p.82; Conf Exs., pp.5-9.) Dr. Traughber
noted Ms. Oxford reported an extensive history of severe mental illness, including diagnoses of
schizophrenia, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. (Conf Exs., p.6.) Dr. Traughber diagnosed
Ms. Oxford with a psychotic disorder, and recommended inpatient treatment. (Conf Exs., p.8.)
Based on Dr. Traughber's evaluation, the magistrate court ordered Ms. Oxford into the
custody of the Department of Health and Welfare on October 27, 2017. (R., pp.78-80, 82-85.) On
December 21, 2017, the Chief of Psychology at State Hospital South filed a report with the court,
stating Ms. Oxford's competence had been restored and she was now fit to proceed. (R., p.88;
Conf Docs., pp.43-45.) On January 8, 2018, the magistrate court held a preliminary hearing, and
bound Ms. Oxford over to the district court. (R., pp.94-95.) The State then filed an Information
charging Ms. Oxford with burglary and second degree kidnapping. (R., pp.101-02.)
Counsel for Ms. Oxford filed a motion for appointment of an expert witness, requesting
an order "approving the retention of a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist to review the facts in
this matter . . . and to advise the Defendant regarding her defense in this matter that her mental
health situation on the date of the incident ... was such that she could not have possessed the
requisite intent to have committed the offenses charged." (R., pp.113-15.) Counsel requested
funding for the expert based on Ms. Oxford's indigence. (R., p.114.) The district court held a
hearing on Ms. Oxford's motion, and ruled it was "going to grant the motion, with one
exception," which was that the public defender's office had to pay for the expert witness out of
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its budget. (Tr., p.10, L.18-p.11, L.3.) Following the hearing, the district court ordered the costs
for the expert "shall be paid by the Public Defender's budget." (R., p.119.)
Prior to trial, counsel for Ms. Oxford filed a motion in limine requesting a ruling that "the
Defendant is allowed to produce evidence that she suffered from a mental illness which resulted
in her inability to form the required intent ... and a ruling that Dr. Traughber will be allowed to
testify regarding his observations and conclusions about the Defendant during the competency
evaluation." (R., pp.174, 179-80.) Counsel told the district court he "made a request for funds to
be allocated from the public defender's office budget [for the retention of an expert witness], but
was denied because the funds were necessary for the defense of a capital case, State of Idaho v.

Brad Compher, CR-2014-12727-FE." (R., p.174.)
The district court held a hearing on Ms. Oxford's motion. (7/2/18 Tr., pp.1-21.) The
district court asked counsel if he had a report from Dr. Traughber. (7/2/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-8.)
Counsel explained "the 18-211 exam was the only evaluation and the only opinion [he'd] ever
gotten from Dr. Traughber." (7/2/18 Tr., p.8., Ls.23-25.) Counsel said he wanted Dr. Traughber
to testify "[t]o his observations and professional opinion" regarding the mental illness she was
suffering from at the time of the crime." (7/2/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-11.) The district court said it
would have to determine at trial whether the defense could lay a foundation for Dr. Traughber' s
testimony. (7/2/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.12-25.)
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to exclude Dr. Traughber. (R., pp.229-31.) The
State argued his testimony "is irrelevant and would be confusing to the jury" because the
competency evaluation "does not determine the ability of the defendant to form the necessary
intent to commit the crime." (R., pp.229-30.) The State said a mens rea evaluation would need to
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have been completed, and was never done. (R., p.330.) The district court held a hearing on the
State's motion, and ruled as follows:
There's no question that the case law allows you to put on an expert witness to
testify as to whether or not . . . the accused has the ability to form the intent
necessary to commit the crimes; in this case kidnapping and burglary, which are
specific-intent crimes ....
And you can put expert testimony on to testify that she did not have the ability to
form the specific intent to commit those crimes. That's the compromise that the
legislature came up with, and the cases have confirmed, to get rid of the insanity
defense.
But if he can't get on the stand and testify that based on my evaluation ... she
was unable to form the specific intent necessary to commit these crimes, then ...
how she was acting at the time that he interviewed her . . . is completely
irrelevant. I can't see any basis for a defense on that.
(Tr., p.21, L.24 - p.22, L.21.) At trial, the district court ruled the defense had not presented a
sufficient foundation for allowing Dr. Traughber to testify regarding Ms. Oxford's mental
condition because his role in evaluating Ms. Oxford was solely to determine competency.
(Tr., p.141, L.11 -p.142, L.11.)
At trial, the jury heard testimony from Ms. Thometz and one police officer. (Tr., pp.165226.) The jury did not hear any evidence regarding Ms. Oxford's lengthy history of mental
illness. The district court instructed defense counsel that, in closing, he "can't make any
reference to mental health issues." (Tr., p.234, Ls.12-15.) With respect to mental illness, the jury
was instructed only that "[ o ]ur law provides that mental illness is not a defense to any charge of
criminal conduct." (R., p.277.) The jury reached a verdict after less than one hour of deliberation,
finding Ms. Oxford guilty on both counts. (R., pp.237, 246.)
The district court ordered a full mental health assessment of Ms. Oxford in advance of
sentencing. (R., p.250.) The mental health assessment reflects that Ms. Oxford has suffered from
mental health problems her entire life, and had been hospitalized for psychiatric treatment six
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times as an adult. (Con£ Docs., p.26.) The licensed clinical professional counselor who
evaluated Ms. Oxford concluded "it is clear that Ms. Oxford suffers from a severe and persistent
mental illness." (Con£ Docs., p.30.)
The district court sentenced Ms. Oxford for second degree kidnapping to a unified term
of ten years, with three years fixed, and for burglary, to a unified term of five years, with two
years fixed, to be served concurrently. (12/3/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-8.) The district court suspended the
sentences and placed Ms. Oxford on probation for six years, with the primary condition that she
be accepted into, and participate successfully in, the Life and Recovery Program. (12/3/18
Tr., p.7, Ls.9-16.) Ms. Oxford filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.293-96, 299-309).

At sentencing, the district court ordered Ms. Oxford to pay $6,072.09 in restitution to the
Idaho Industrial Commission for medical treatment allegedly received by Ms. Thometz. (12/3/18
Tr., p.7, Ls.19-20.) Counsel for Ms. Oxford objected, and the district court said it was going to
order it, but counsel could "bring up another argument about that later if [he wanted] to."
(12/3/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-11.) The district court entered the restitution order on December 4, 2018,
and the order was recorded on January 30, 2019. (R., pp.287-90.) Counsel for Ms. Oxford filed
an objection. (R., pp.291-92.) The district court overruled the objection following a hearing.
(2/7/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.23-25.) The district court ordered, however, that the State submit additional
information supporting its restitution request by February 21, 2019. (2/7/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.23-25;
p.12, Ls.3-13.) The State did not submit any additional information to the district court.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court deny Ms. Oxford her constitutional right to due process and equal
protection when it denied her motion for funds to retain an expert witness?

II.

Did the district court err in refusing to allow Dr. Traughber to testify as an expert witness
for the defense at trial?

III.

Did the district court err in ordering Ms. Oxford to pay restitution in the amount of
$6,072.09 to the Idaho Industrial Commission for expenses ostensibly incurred by
Ms. Thometz for medical treatment?

7

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Denied Ms. Oxford Her Constitutional Right To Due Process And Equal
Protection And Violated LC. § 19-852(a)(2) When It Denied Her Motion For Funds To Retain
An Expert Witness To Assist With Her Defense

A.

Introduction
Counsel for Ms. Oxford realized early in his representation of Ms. Oxford that she could

have a complete defense to the charges against her based on lack of specific intent. Counsel filed
a motion for appointment of, and funds for, a psychiatrist or psychologist to assist in the defense
of Ms. Oxford based on her lack of specific intent. The district court effectively denied the
motion by ordering the costs for the expert be paid out of the public defender's budget, as there
was no money in the budget to hire an expert in this case. The defense was thus unable to defend
based on lack of specific intent, and the jury heard no evidence at trial regarding Ms. Oxford's
extensive history of severe mental illness. By denying Ms. Oxford's request for funds to retain
an expert witness, the district court denied her constitutional right to due process and equal
protection and violated LC. § 19-852(a)(2).

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a district court's denial of a request for expert assistance at public

expense for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Brackett, 160 Idaho 619, 634 (Ct. App. 2016). In
reviewing a trial court's exercise of discretion, this Court must determine whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific
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choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho
598, 600 (1989).

C.

Ms. Oxford Was Subjected To An Unfair Trial Because She Was Denied Expert
Assistance At Public Expense
"Indigent defendants are entitled as a matter of due process and equal protection to the

basic tools of an adequate defense, including the provision of expert assistance at public expense,
when such is necessary for a fair trial." Brackett, 160 Idaho at 633-34 (citations omitted); see

also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985) (noting "justice cannot be equal where, simply as
a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a
judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake"). In Idaho, these due process and equal
protection rights are safeguarded by LC. § 19-852(a)(2), which provides that needy defendants
are entitled "to be provided with the necessary services and facilities ofrepresentation (including
investigation and other preparation)." Brackett, 160 Idaho at 634. Whether a defendant in a
particular case is entitled to additional assistance at public expense "depends upon [the] needs of
the defendant as revealed by the facts and circumstances of each case." State v. Powers, 96 Idaho
833, 838 (1975); see also State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395 (1982).
Here, the district court denied Ms. Oxford her constitutional right to due process and
equal protection and violated LC. § 19-852(a)(2) when it denied her funds to retain a psychiatrist
or psychologist to assist with her defense. Dr. Traughber, a licensed psychologist, evaluated
Ms. Oxford at defense counsel's request prior to the preliminary hearing, and determined she
was not competent to proceed. (R., pp.57-64, 82; Con£ Exs., pp.5-9.) Dr. Traughber noted
Ms. Oxford reported an extensive history of severe mental illness, including previous diagnoses
of schizophrenia, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. (Con£ Exs., p.6.) Dr. Traughber diagnosed
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Ms. Oxford with a psychotic disorder, and recommended inpatient treatment. (Conf. Exs., p.8.)
Ms. Oxford’s competence was restored only after she was hospitalized at the State Hospital
South. (R., pp.88, 94-95; Conf. Docs., pp.43-45.)
After the Information was filed, counsel for Ms. Oxford filed a motion for appointment of
an expert witness, requesting an order “approving the retention of a licensed psychiatrist or
psychologist to review the facts in this matter, including an interview of the Defendant, and to
advise the Defendant regarding her defense in this matter that her mental health situation on the
date of the incident . . . was such that she could not have possessed the requisite intent to have
committed the offenses charged.” (R., pp.113-15.) Counsel told the district court:
Based on counsel’s contact with the Defendant shortly after her arrest and
thereafter, her hospitalization, the testimony at the preliminary hearing, review of
the recordings of contact by law enforcement with the Defendant at the time of
the incident, it is believed that the Defendant has a defense to the specific intent
portions of the charges brought against her.
(R., p.114.) Counsel requested funding for the expert based on Ms. Oxford’s indigence.
(R., p.114.) The district court ruled:
As to the appointment of the expert, I think . . . this makes some sense, that you
want to at least explore that possibility, and we can argue at some later date as to
whether anything you find is admissible or not on the question of intent.
So I’m going to grant the motion, with one exception: And that is the PD’s office
does have, I think, an expert witness portion of their budget. So—and we’re in
January. So I would think that—I’m reluctant to order the district court to pay for
it if there is a budget amount for that.
(Tr., p.10, L.18 – p.11, L.3.) The district court ordered the costs for the expert “shall be paid by
the Public Defender’s budget.” (R., p.119.)
Prior to trial, counsel for Ms. Oxford filed a motion in limine requesting a ruling that “the
Defendant is allowed to produce evidence that she suffered from a mental illness which resulted
in her inability to form the required intent to commit Burglary and Kidnapping In The Second
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Degree, and a ruling that Dr. Traughber will be allowed to testify regarding his observations and
conclusions about the Defendant during the competency evaluation.” (R., pp.174, 179-80.)
Counsel told the district court that, following its earlier ruling, he “made a request for funds to be
allocated from the public defender’s office budget [for the retention of an expert witness], but
was denied because the funds were necessary for the defense of a capital case, State of Idaho v.
Brad Compher, CR-2014-12727-FE.” (R., p.174.)
The district court held a hearing on Ms. Oxford’s motion. (7/2/18 Tr., pp.1-21.) The
district court asked counsel for Ms. Oxford, “So do you have a report from Dr. Traughber, and is
that . . . report . . . the extent of the opinions he’s going to offer?” (7/2/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-8.)
Counsel explained “the 18-211 exam was the only evaluation and the only opinion [he’d] ever
gotten from Dr. Traughber.” (7/2/18 Tr., p.8., Ls.23-25.) Counsel explained he wanted
Dr. Traughber to testify “[t]o his observations and professional opinion” regarding the mental
illness she was suffering from at the time of the crime.” (7/2/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-11.) The district
court said, “I do think that the defendant’s allowed to present evidence that goes to the question
of can the defendant form the requisite mental intent . . . .” (7/2/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-10.) The
district court said it would have to determine at trial whether the defense could lay a foundation
for Dr. Traughber’s testimony. (7/2/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.12-25.) The district court ultimately
determined Dr. Traughber could not testify as an expert, and ruled it would not instruct the jury
on mental health issues because the defense had no admissible evidence regarding Ms. Oxford’s
mental health. (Tr., p.141, L.11 – p.142, L.11, p.143, Ls.7-9.)
Thus, because the district court denied Ms. Oxford’s request for funds to retain a
psychiatrist or psychologist to assist with the defense, and because such funds were not available
from the public defender’s office due to financial constraints arising from that office’s
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concurrent defense of a capital case, Ms. Oxford was not able to argue to the jury that she had
mental health issues which may have provided her with a complete defense to the charges
against her. Indeed, the jury did not even learn that Ms. Oxford has a history of severe mental
illness, and was diagnosed with a psychotic disorder just a few weeks after her alleged criminal
conduct. (Conf. Exs., pp.6, 8.)
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Ake v. Oklahoma that “psychiatrists for
each party enable the jury to make its most accurate determination of the truth on the issue
before them.” 470 U.S. at 81. Thus, the Ake Court held that “when a defendant demonstrates to
the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the
State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the
defense.” Id. at 83. That clearly did not happen here. Ms. Oxford was granted a competency
evaluation after the filing of a criminal complaint, but was denied a subsequent psychiatric
examination which would have assisted her in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of
her defense.
In State v. Olin, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that “a defendant’s request for expert
or investigative services should be reviewed in light of all the circumstances and be measured
against the standard of ‘fundamental fairness’ embodied in the due process clause.” 103 Idaho at
394. The Court said:
It is thus incumbent upon the trial court to inquire into the needs of the defendant
and the circumstances of the case, and then make a determination of whether an
adequate defense will be available to the defendant without the requested expert
or investigative aid. If the answer is in the negative, then the services are
necessary and must be provided by the state.
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Id. at 395. In other words, "[b ]efore authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a particular
purpose in an indigent's defense, the trial court must determine whether the funds are necessary
in the interest of justice." State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 382 (2013) (quoting State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 65 (2003)).
Here, the district court agreed with defense counsel that appointing an expert to evaluate
Ms. Oxford "makes some sense," but denied the request for funds to retain such an expert. In
effect, the district court told Ms. Oxford she could hire an expert if she could afford it. 2 Because
of her poverty, she could not. And as a result of the district court's decision, Ms. Oxford was not
able to present a defense that would have allowed the jury to make an accurate determination as
to her intent. Any dispute between the district court and the public defender's office regarding
the public defender's budget should not have harmed Ms. Oxford in the presentation of her
defense. Ms. Oxford was denied her constitutional right to a fair trial, and is entitled to relief on
appeal. See Brackett, 160 Idaho at 633-34.

II.
The District Court Erred In Refusing To Allow Dr. Traughber To Testify As An Expert Witness
For The Defense At Trial

A.

Introduction
Counsel for Ms. Oxford wanted to call Dr. Traughber at trial to provide expert testimony

regarding Ms. Oxford's mental health. The district court concluded Dr. Traughber could not
testify at trial because his role in evaluating Ms. Oxford was solely to determine her competency.
The district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Traughber from testifying as an expert

2

This is, of course, always the standard. A defendant who has sufficient financial means does
not need to file a motion with the court to hire an expert.
13

witness for the defense because his testimony would have helped the jury to understand the
evidence and determine a fact at issue-specifically, whether Ms. Oxford had the specific intent
to commit burglary and second degree kidnapping.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The admission of expert opinion testimony pursuant to LR.E. 702 is reviewed on appeal

under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 875 (1995). In reviewing
a trial court's exercise of discretion, this Court must determine whether the trial court: (1)
correctly perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific
choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.

C.

Dr. Traughber's Testimony Would Have Helped The Jury To Understand The Evidence
And Determine A Fact At Issue In This Case
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 states, in pertinent part, that "[a] witness who is qualified as

an expert ... may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue." Where state of mind is an element of the offense, LC. § 18-207(3)
provides for the admission of expert evidence on the issue of mens rea, subject to the rules of
evidence. See State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1981).
Ms. Oxford was charged with burglary and second degree kidnapping. (R., pp.101-02.)
State of mind is an element of both of these offenses. See LC. § 18-1401 (criminalizing the act of
entering any building "with intent to commit any theft or any felony"); LC. § 18-4501(1)
(criminalizing the act of kidnapping another "with intent to cause him ... to be secretly confined
or imprisoned ... or in any way held ... kept or detained against his will"); LC. § 18-4501(2)
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(criminalizing the act of taking a child away from its parent or guardian “with intent to keep or
conceal”).
Counsel for Ms. Oxford sought to call Dr. Traughber as an expert at trial to testify “[t]o
his observations and professional opinion” regarding the mental illness she was suffering from at
the time of the crime.” (7/2/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-11.) The State argued Dr. Traughber’s testimony
was “irrelevant and would be confusing to the jury” because the competency evaluation “does
not determine the ability of the defendant to form the necessary intent to commit the crime.”
(R., pp.229-30.) The district court ruled if Dr. Traughber “can’t get on the stand and testify that
based on [his] evaluation . . . she was unable to form the specific intent necessary to commit
these crimes, then . . . how she was acting at the time that he interviewed her . . . is completely
irrelevant.” (Tr., p.22, Ls.12-21.) At trial, the district court ruled the defense had not presented a
sufficient foundation for Dr. Traughber’s testimony because his role was solely to determine
competency. (Tr., p.141, L.11 – p.142, L.11.)
The district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Traughber’s testimony as his
testimony would have helped the jury to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue.
Dr. Traughber evaluated Ms. Oxford on October 3, 2017, which was less than a month after the
incident that led to Ms. Oxford’s criminal charges. (See R., pp.101-02.) He interviewed her,
reviewed her records, conducted a mental status examination, and reviewed information
regarding her behavior in jail. (Conf. Docs., p.37.) He noted Ms. Oxford reported an “extensive
history of severe mental illness” and concluded she “is currently, and has likely suffered from a
mental illness for some time.” (Conf. Docs., pp.37-38.) He further concluded her “problems
affect her cognitive processes, behavior, and certainly her impulse control.” (Conf. Docs., p.38.)
He ultimately diagnosed her with a psychotic disorder. (Conf. Docs., p.39.)
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The district court was correct to conclude that Dr. Traughber could not testify that, based
on his evaluation, Ms. Oxford "was unable to form the specific intent necessary to commit these
crimes." (Tr., p.22, Ls.12-21.) But that does not make his testimony inadmissible. "Expert
testimony is generally admissible if evidence is beyond the common experience of most jurors
and the jurors would be assisted by such testimony." State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853, 26 P.3d
31, 36 (2001) (citation omitted). Dr. Traughber could have testified regarding his clinical
diagnosis of Ms. Oxford, which is a concept beyond the common experience of most jurors, and
would have assisted the jurors in evaluating the evidence.
Expert opinions are inadmissible only when the normal experience of jurors permits them
to draw proper conclusions from the evidence without the need for expert testimony. See State v.

Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42 (Ct. App. 1998). That is not the case here. Absent Dr. Traughber's
testimony, the jury heard evidence regarding Ms. Oxford's bizarre behavior and statements to the
police, but it heard no evidence that Ms. Oxford had an extensive history of severe mental
illness, and was diagnosed with a psychotic disorder shortly after the alleged crime. Testimony
regarding Ms. Oxford's mental condition would have assisted the jurors in determining whether
Ms. Oxford possessed the specific intent necessary to be found guilty of burglary and second
degree kidnapping, which was an element it was instructed the State had to prove. (R., pp.272,
275.)
Because the jury did not hear any evidence about Ms. Oxford's mental illness, the district
court refused to instruct the jury, as requested by the defense, that it "should consider the
defendant's mental condition in determining whether the defendant had the intent to commit" the
crimes of burglary and second degree kidnapping. (R., pp.163, 164; Tr., p.142, Ls.15-23.) The
district court also ruled defense counsel "can't make any reference to mental health issues" in
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closing. (Tr., p.234, Ls.12-15.) With respect to mental health, the jury was instructed only that
"[ o ]ur law provides that mental illness is not a defense to any charge of criminal conduct."
(R., p.277.)
The district court's ruling excluding Dr. Traughber from testifying all but eviscerated
Ms. Oxford's defense. Dr. Traughber's testimony was admissible under I.R.E. 702 and LC. § 18207(3), and the district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. The district
court's error in excluding Dr. Traughber's testimony was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, and Ms. Oxford is entitled to relief on appeal. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222
(2010) (where a district court makes an erroneous evidentiary ruling in favor of the State, the
State has the burden on appeal of demonstrating the district court's error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt); State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 466 (Ct. App. 2010) ("To hold an error
harmless, this Court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.").

III.
The District Court Erred In Ordering Ms. Oxford To Pay Restitution In The Amount Of
$6,072.09 To The Idaho Industrial Commission For Expenses Ostensibly Incurred By
Ms. Thometz For Medical Treatment

A.

Introduction
The district court ordered Ms. Oxford to pay restitution to the Idaho Industrial

Commission in the amount of $6,072.09 for medical expenses ostensibly incurred by
Ms. Thometz based on a one-page, unsworn document from the Idaho Industrial Commission,
and the prosecutor's statement that the amount it sought was "just for medical expenses" from
when Ms. Thometz went to the emergency room and "had to do some CT scans." (R., p.225;
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2/7/19 Tr., p.2, L.24 - p.3, L.4.) The district court recognized some additional information was
necessary to support the State's request, but nonetheless entered the restitution order as
requested, absent any additional information. The district court abused its discretion in awarding
restitution in the absence of substantial evidence supporting the request.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The decision of whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the discretion

of a trial court .... " State v. Burggraf, 160 Idaho 177, 179 (Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted).
This Court "will not overturn an order of restitution unless an abuse of discretion is shown." Id.
(citation omitted). In reviewing a trial court's exercise of discretion, this Court must determine
whether the trial court:

(1) correctly perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of

discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Awarding Restitution In The Absence Of
Substantial Evidence Supporting The Request
The State submitted a request for restitution prior to Ms. Oxford's sentencing, seeking an

order requiring Ms. Oxford to pay $6,072.29 to the Idaho Industrial Commission. (R., pp.22325.) In support of its request, the State submitted an unswom letter to the district court from the
Crime Victims Compensation Program stating it was "requesting restitution for payments made
on behalf of Bambie Thometz." (R., p.224.) The payment summary lists the following charges:
•
•

ID EM-1 Medical Services, P.C., billed amount $1,616.00, amount
allowed $326.14
Medical Imaging Associates, billed amount $396.00, amount allowed
$348.23
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•

Portneuf Medical Center, billed amount $6,747.15, amount allowed
$5,397.72

(R., p.225.) There is no information regarding the dates of service or the nature of the services
provided. (R., p.225) There is also no information on what amount the Idaho Industrial
Commission actually paid. (R., p.225.)
At sentencing, the district court ordered Ms. Oxford to pay $6,072.09 in restitution to the
Idaho Industrial Commission based on the State’s request. (12/3/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.19-20.) Counsel
for Ms. Oxford objected, and the district court said it was going to order it, but counsel could
“bring up another argument about that later if [he wanted] to.” (12/3/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-11.) The
district court entered the restitution order on December 4, 2018, and the restitution order was
recorded on January 30, 2019. (R., pp.287-90.) Counsel for Ms. Oxford filed an objection, and
the district court held a hearing on the objection on February 7, 2019. (2/7/19 Tr., p.1, Ls.5-8.)
At the hearing, defense counsel argued, among other things, that “the only thing I got
from the State was a request that the State Insurance Fund wanted paid a particular sum” and
“[t]here was no medical reports . . . or billing to support it.” (2/7/19 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-25.) Counsel
argued “we need some information from the State Insurance Fund that would support the claim.”
(2/7/19 Tr., p.2, Ls.7-9.) The prosecutor responded that the costs were “just for medical
expenses” and not mental health services. (2/7/19 Tr., p.2, L.25 – p.3, L.2.) The prosecutor said,
“It was when Ms. Thometz had to go to the emergency room after she was beaten by the
defendant. She had to get some CT scans.” (2/7/19 Tr., p.3, Ls.2-4.) The district court agreed
with Ms. Oxford that “the request is insufficient as far as providing adequate support.” (2/7/19
Tr., p.3, Ls.11-12.) The district court identified two issues with the request: “One, what bills
were incurred at what times and for what circumstances? To make sure that they’re related to the
events of the particular day. Two, what amounts were actually paid by the Industrial
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Commission? Where there any offsets from the actually incurred bills?" (2/7 /19 Tr., p.3, Ls.1219.) The district court requested additional information from the prosecutor "so that [it] could
adequately review the request." (2/7 /19 Tr., p.3, L.24 - p.4, L.1.) The prosecutor said it "can get
those documents" and "can have that submitted to the Court by next week." (2/7 /19 Tr., p.4,
Ls.2-3, p.5, Ls.17-20.)
The district court overruled Ms. Oxford's general objection to restitution (based on
whether Ms. Thometz was a victim within the meaning of the restitution statute) but "with the
caveat that I want the information that I've asked for." (2/7/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.23-25.) The district
court requested the additional information from the State by February 21, 2019, and said it would
"make a final ruling after all submissions are made." (2/7/19 Tr., p.12, Ls.3-13; see also Minute
Entry & Order, filed February 13, 2019.) 3 The State did not submit any additional information to
the district court supporting its request, and the district court never entered a final ruling on
restitution, meaning the restitution order filed on December 4, 2018, and recorded on January 30,
2019, remains in effect.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held the amount of restitution to award "is a question of
fact for the district court, whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial
evidence." State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919 (2017) (citation omitted); see also State v. Taie,
138 Idaho 878, 879 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Once it is determined that an award is appropriate ... the
amount of the award must be supported by substantial evidence."). "Substantial evidence is
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Wisdom, 161
Idaho at 919 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

3

The Record does not contain the district court's Minute Entry & Order, filed February 13,
2019. Simultaneously with the filing of this Appellant's Brief, Ms. Oxford is filing a Motion to
Augment the Record to include a copy of this Order.
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Here, the State did not submit substantial evidence to the district court in support of its
restitution request. The fact that payment was made by the Crime Victims Compensation
Program to three medical providers for the allegedly of Ms. Thometz is not enough. As the
district court recognized, there is no information regarding "what bills were incurred at what
times and for what circumstances" and "what amounts were actually paid by the Industrial
Commission." (2/7/19 Tr., p.3, Ls.12-19.) The prosecutor's unsworn statements are not, in and of
themselves, evidence. See Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 716 (Ct. App. 2012); State v.
Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 26 (Ct. App. 2009). Because the State never provided the district court

with the information it requested, the district court should have vacated the restitution order filed
on December 4, 2018, and denied the State's request for restitution.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Oxford respectfully requests that the Court vacate her judgment of conviction, and
remand this case to the district court for a new trial. She also requests that the Court vacate the
order of restitution.
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2019.

Is/ Andrea W. Reyno Ids
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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